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Domestic violence is one of the gravest threats to women's liberty
in this country and around the world.' According to a 1994 Depart-
ment of Justice report, sixty percent of all murders committed by a
person against a spouse involve husbands killing their wives.2 While the
inevitability of death for many women in situations of marital violence
is a significant infringement on liberty, the possibility of incarceration
for those women who defend themselves likewise poses a threat. In fact,
the Justice Department's Report found that forty percent of all murders
committed by a person against her spouse involved wives who killed
their husbands , and these women usually ended up behind bars.4
• Associate, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson. J.D., University of Michigan
Law School, 1998; BA., University of Michigan, 1995.
1. See, e.g., Amy Borrus, What the U.N. Women's Conference Can Do For Women, Busi-
NESS WEEK, Sept. 4, 1995, at 42 ("Domestic violence is the leading cause of death
globally for women aged 14 to 44.").
2. See Marina Angel, Criminal Law and Women: Giving the Abused Woman Who Kills a
Jury of her Peers Who Appreciate Trifles, 33 AM. CraM. L. REv. 229, 284 (1996)
(citing John M. Dawson & Patrick A. Langan, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Special Report:
Murder in Families, 3 & tbl.2. (1994)).
3. See Angel, supra note 2, at 284 (citing John M. Dawson & Patrick A. Langan, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Special Report. Murder in Families, 3 & tbl.2. (1994)).
4. See Angel, supra note 2, at 311-12 ("Women spousal homicide defendants had a...
conviction rate generally [of] 70% .... (citing Patrick A. Langan & John M. Daw-
son, U.S. Dep't of Justice, SPOUSE MURDER DEFENDArrS IN LARGE URAN
COUNTIES iii (1995)).
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Attorneys for defendants who kill their spouses or other intimate
partners zealously try to protect their client's freedom by arguing various
defenses at trial. The cultural and battered woman syndrome (BWS)
defenses are two legal defenses attorneys for intimate homicide5 defen-
dants use that have generated an enormous amount of scholarly and
practitioner debate. Immigrant minority men are the defendants who
usually use the cultural defense in intimate homicides.6 The cultural
defense seeks to mitigate or justify the homicide by showing that the
defendant's culture and values led him to commit the crime without the
necessary bad mind or mens rea. Those who use the cultural defense
sometimes offer evidence showing that in the defendant's culture, the
defendant's act would not be criminal but socially acceptable; thus the
defendant did not know that his act was wrong.7 Because this defense
only works if the defendant is a recent immigrant without reasonable
knowledge of what Americans consider criminal, the more common
way to use the cultural defense is to show that the defendant's culture
led him to incorrectly interpret the facts or to react in a "heat of pas-
sion."8 Used in this way, the cultural defense works to mitigate the
criminal responsibility of the defendant, often reducing the charge from
murder to manslaughter.9
The BWS defense, on the other hand, is used by women who kill
their abusive intimate partners. A woman who presents this defense
5. I use the term "intimate homicide" to refer to all homicides involving persons in an
intimate relationship, whether they are spouses or boyfriend and girlfriend.
6. Immigrant women also use the cultural defense. See infia notes 72-85 and accompa-
nying text.
7. There are at least two other uses of the cultural defense. For an elaboration of the
defense and examples of its use, see discussion infra Part I.B.
8. See, e.g., Led Volpp, (Mis)Identifing Culture: Asian Women and the "Cultural Defense,"
17 HA v. WOsaEN's L.J. 57, 57-77 (1994) [hereinafter Volpp, (Mis)Identeing Culi-
ture]; Susan Girardo Roy, Note,. Restoring Hope or Tolerating Abuse? Responses to
Domestic Violence Against Immigrant Women, 9 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 263, 266-67,
280-81 (1995).
9. See Roy, supra note 8, at 281:
An example of the continuing effectiveness of the heat of passion defense,
combined with cultural factors, is the case of Sea Thach, a Cambodian
immigrant who killed his immigrant wife and her lover when he found
them in bed together. The prosecutors charged him with first-degree mur-
der, but the judge lessened the conviction to voluntary manslaughter....
In fact, a study prepared by the Justice Department, entitled "Murder in
Families," indicated that 36.5% of all men who kill their spouses are con-
victed of voluntary manslaughter, the most lenient type of intentional
homicide charge.
Roy, supra note 8, at 281 (citations omitted).
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seeks to justify or at the very least to mitigate the defendant's criminal
responsibility: the woman believed leaving was impossible, and therefore
she had to kill. Thus, the defense reveals that the battered woman either
acted reasonably in self-defense given the nature of domestic violence,
or that the woman acted under a diminished mental capacity resulting
from repeated abuse by the batterer. Through the successful use of this
defense, battered women who kill are either acquitted or are convicted
for the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter as opposed to first-
degree murder.'0
The use of these two defenses has generated an abundant scholar-
ship on the merits and demerits of each. Within this debate,
multiculturalists who support the use of cultural defenses fight vigor-
ously with feminists who argue that cultural defenses perpetuate sex
discrimination and should therefore be prohibited." Proponents of the
cultural defense respond that barring cultural evidence that would prop-
erly show the defendant lacked the necessary mens rea to be held
criminally responsible for the crime would be discriminatory against
immigrants.' 2 Moreover, they state that only by allowing immigrants to
present evidence of their culture can the justice system live up to its
commitment to individualized justice and cultural pluralism. 3 Femi-
nists, however, claim that while individualized justice and cultural
pluralism are proper goals of the criminal justice system, the call of
multiculturalism must not strengthen sex-based stereotypes that
10. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 590 N.E.2d 681, 682 (Mass. 1992); Angel,
supra note 2, at 309-12; Shelby A.D. Moore, Battered Women Syndrome: Selling the
Shadow to Support the Substance, 38 How. L.J. 297, 297-99 & nn.1-5 (1995)
(discussing the case of Banks v. State, 608 A.2d 1249 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) in
which the woman's sentence was reduced from second degree murder to manslaugh-
ter as a result of the battered women syndrome defense).
11. See, e.g., Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence Against Latinas by Latino Males: An Analysis
of Race, National Origin, and Gender Differentials, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 231-
51 (1994); Abbe Smith, Criminal Responsibility, Social Responsibility, and Angry
Young Men: Reflections of a Feminist Criminal Defense Lawyer, 21 N.Y.U. Ray. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 433, 477-80 (1994).
12. See, e.g., Holly Maguigan, Cultural Evidence and Male Violence: Are Feminist and
Multiculturalist Reformers on a Collision Course in Criminal Courts?, 70 N.Y.U. L.
Rav. 36 (1995); Sharon M. Tomao, Note, The Culture Defense: Traditional or For-
mal?, 10 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 241, 241-43 (1996); Led Volpp, Talking "Culture"
Gender, Race, Nation, and the Politics of Multiculturalism, 96 COLuM. L. Ray. 1573,
1611-14 (1996)[hereinafter Volpp, Talking Culture].
13. See, e.g., Taryn F. Goldstein, Comment, Cultural Conflicts in Court: Should the
American Criminal Justice System Formally Recognize a "Cultural Defense"', 99 DicK.
L. Rav. 141, 141-44 (1994).
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promote violence against women; multiculturalism cannot be permitted
to supercede the law. 14
While most feminists argue against the viability of the cultural de-
fense, many support the legitimacy of the BWS defense. The BWS
defense, they argue, educates juries on the realities of domestic violence
and why women must sometimes take their safety into their own hands
and kill in what should be seen as self-defense." If a battered woman is
not able to present evidence regarding the cycle of violence she endured
and the effects of that violence, important information about the con-
text of the murder would wrongflully be omitted; those women would
be denied their constitutional right to a fair trial."
Given the distinction feminists make between the cultural and the
BWS defenses, the logical question that remains to be answered is
whether this distinction is theoretically consistent. Can feminists con-
cerned about the rampant problem of domestic violence differentiate
between the acceptability of the BWS and the cultural defenses in a
logically and theoretically consistent manner? This Article argues that
the BWS and cultural defenses are equally useful in the legal system and
too similar for feminists to discriminate between them. However, be-
cause the harmful effects are great, feminists and the legal system as a
whole must find a way to deal with these problems. This could come
from a radical re-evaluation of what our legal system does and should
value. A partial solution could also be to sensitize the judicial and legal
system while simultaneously establishing adequate social support net-
works and services to combat these problems. Whatever the solution,
feminists must act consistently to promote a goal of equality for all.
They cannot embrace a BWS defense while advocating the elimination
of the cultural defense.
To adequately explain and argue why feminists, as a matter of legal
theory, must take both the BWS and cultural defenses seriously, these
defenses need further elaboration. Section I details what these defenses
are, how they developed, and how they work in the justice system. Sec-
tion II enlarges the picture by revealing the similarities between the two
defenses which share not only the same theoretical and practical goals,
but also the same criticisms and flaws highlighted by scholars. Finally,
14. See, e.g., Volpp, Talking Culture, supra note 12, at 1573-76 (discussing Doriane
Lambeler Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism: The Liberals'
Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1093 (1996), and calling it backlash scholarship).
15. See, e.g., Angel, supra note 2, at 309-12; Elizabeth M. Schneider, Symposium, Resis-
tance to Equality, 57 U. Pn-r. L. REv. 477, 509-12 (1996).
16. Elizabeth M. Schneider valiantly pursues this argument. Schneider, supra note 15, at
486.
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Section III asserts that cultural evidence and evidence of battering must
be admitted to show the absence of mens rea. However, because serious
problems arise from the admission of these two defenses, Section III
discusses one potential approach to mitigating or eliminating the re-
sulting harms and urges the search for more alternatives. The Article
concludes that feminists must accept the admission of cultural evidence
and evidence of battering in domestic violence homicide trials. The
proper response to the problematic aspects of each defense is the search
for specific solutions and approaches to mitigate the harms, not the
abandonment of either defense.
I. THE DEFENSES
Two questions must be answered in the affirmative before a person
is convicted of a crime: did the person commit the act and did the per-
son have the mental state that the law requires to make the act culpable
and punishable?1 7 If the defendant committed the act but does not have
the requisite mens rea, the jury may find that the defendant did not
commit the crime" or that the crime committed is of a lesser degree
than that charged. In domestic violence homicide trials, whether the
woman or man killed her or his intimate partner is often not at issue.
Rather, the question is whether the defendant possessed the proper
mens rea-purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence.!9 Both the
BWS and cultural defenses seek to negate the requisite mens rea and
thereby at least excuse, if not justify, the defendant's actions."
A. The Battered Woman Syndrome Defense
The BWS defense, which provides for expert testimony on the ef-
fects of domestic violence and why abused women kill their abusers, is
derived from Lenore Walker's research and resulting theory of learned
17. See MODEL PENAL CODE % 2.01, 2.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
18. Note the word "crime" as opposed to "act." Commission of the act without the req-
uisite mens rea eliminates the existence of a "crime." See generally MODEL PENAL
CODE, supra note 17, at § 2.02.
19. See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 17, at §§ 210.1-210.4.
20. An excuse results in a mitigated sentence, whereas a justification, such as self-defense,
is grounds for an acquittal. See CRIMiNAL LAW AND ITS PROCaSSS: CASES AND MA-
TERIALS 801-46, 893-96 (Sanford H. Kadish & Stephen J. Schulhofer eds., 6th ed.
1995).
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helplessness.2 The theory exposes the cyclical nature of the violence:
"gradual tension building, acute violence, and loving contrition." 22 As a
result of this violent cycle, the theory states, battered women often be-
come so accustomed to suffering abuse without any recourse that they
begin to believe they have no control over the occurrence of battering.
Feeling that the situation is hopeless they "give up" trying to leave. The
learned helplessness theory therefore attempts to explain why battered
women often fail to or are unable to leave the abusive relationship:
"Once the women are operating from a belief of helplessness, the per-
ception becomes reality and they become passive, submissive, 'helpless.'
They allow things that appear to them to be out of their control actually
to get oui of their control."2' The theory suggests that the reason these
women kill their abusers in the end is that they do not understand the
consequences of violence and that they are powerless to stop the abuse
24in any other way.
Walker's theory of learned helplessness, published in 1979, was the
first major articulation of the effects of domestic violence. The lack of
knowledge and understanding of the battered woman prompted
Walker's work. However, within a decade, the learned helplessness the-
21. See generally LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN (1979).
22. Robert F. Schopp et al., Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and the Dis-
tinction Between Justification andExcuse, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 45, 51 (1994).
23. WALKER, supra note 21, at 47.
[Tin applying the learned helplessness concept to battered women, the
process of how the battered woman becomes victimized grows clearer. Re-
peated batterings, like electrical shocks, diminish the woman's motivation
to respond. She becomes passive. Secondly, her cognitive ability to perceive
success is changed. She does not believe her response will result in a favor-
able outcome, whether or not it might. Next, having generalized her
helplessness, the battered woman does not believe anything she does will
alter any outcome, not just the specific situation that has occurred. She
says, "No matter what I do, I have no influence." She cannot think of al-
ternatives. She says, "I am incapable and too stupid to learn how to change
things." Finally, her sense of emotional well-being becomes precarious. She
is more prone to depression and anxiety.
WALKER, supra note 21, at 49-50.
24. See WALKER, supra note 21, at 52.
There seems to be little doubt that feelings of powerlessness by both men
and women contribute to the cause and maintenance of violent behav-
ior.... One result of learned helplessness can be depression, as discussed
previously. Another result seems to be a change in the battered woman's
perception of the consequences of violence. Living constantly with fear
seems to produce an imperviousness to the seriousness of violence.
WALKER, supra note 21, at 51-52.
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ory was attacked for promoting a "victim" view of battered women
which misrepresents the attempts women actually do make to leave and
seek help. One alternative explanation and theory that developed was
the survivor theory, which maintains that battered women are active
survivors who remain in "abusive situations not because they have been
passive but because they have tried to escape with no avail."25 Instead of
becoming increasingly helpless, battered women increasingly seek assis-
tance and make efforts to stop the abuse and/or leave.2
As the abuse escalates, battered women will seek more and more
help from family and friends, from police, and from various community
services such as shelters.27 However, because the "help sources" can be
inadequate or piecemeal, the women may have "little alternative but to
return to the batterer," although the "help seeking continues."28 In es-
sence, therefore, the survivor theory points out that many of the
women's decisions to stay represent rational decisions: although help
seeking increases as the abuse increases, this help seeking "may be medi-
ated, as current research suggests, by the resources available to the
woman, her commitment to the relationship, the number of children
she has, and the kinds of abuse she may have experienced as a child."
29
The help seeking is also mediated by the real potential for social stigma
and poverty that battered women who leave face.30
25. EDWARD GONDOLF & ELLEN FISHER, BATTERED WOMEN As SuRvIvoRs: AN ALTER-
NATIVE TO TREATING LARNED HELPLESSNESS (1988), excerpted in DoMESrlc
VIOLENCE LAW: A COMPREHENSIVE OVERVIEW OF CASES AND SouRcES 78, 82
(Nancy K.D. Lemon ed., 1996).
26. See GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 25, at 82-83. It is interesting to note that Lenore
Walker's work also provides support for this survivor theory: "Walker found ... that
the women in her ... sample were not necessarily beaten into submissiveness; rather,
help seeking increased as the positive reinforcements within the relationship de-
creased and the costs of the relationship in terms of abusiveness and injury
increased." GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 25, at 82-83.
27. See GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 25, at 79-83; see also Angel, supra note 2, at
284-86.
28. GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 25, at 79 & tbl.2-1.
29. GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 25, at 82.
30. See GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 25, at 82-83.
The women face tremendous uncertainty in separating even temporarily
from the barterer. They fear reprisals for leaving, loss of custody of the
children, and losing their home and financial support. The unknown of
trying to survive on one's own can be as frightening as returning to a vio-
lent man. The prospects of obtaining employment sufficient to support
oneself and children are minimal for most shelter women, especially con-
sidering their [possible] lack of previous experience and education. This
coupled with the feminization of poverty in contemporary America ...
makes a return to the barterer the lesser of the two evils. At least there is a
2000]
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It is only when this help seeking fails, according to this theory, that
a woman will continue to remain in the abusive relationship until either
she kills the batterer or he kills her.
Both the learned helplessness theory and the survivor theory share
the view that leaving is extremely difficult for battered women, that the
women are often unsuccessful because their batterers exercise power and
control, and that the battering is largely unaffected by the women's at-
tempts to appease their batterers and stop the violence. The theories
differ as to the type of woman the battered woman is: passive and help-
less versus active and a survivor. The dominant characterization of the
BWS defense, which courts use today, was first formulated by Walker
and contains the learned helplessness theory.3'
Defense attorneys, through expert testimony, use the BWS defense
either to support a claim of self-defense so as to be excused from crimi-
nal liability, or at the very least to support a claim for a lesser charge
than premeditated murder, like voluntary manslaughter. When arguing
self-defense, the BWS defense is used to show why the defendant be-
lieved that danger was imminent even though the batterer was asleep or
was not beating her at the moment preceding death. The theory, after
all, is that the woman has been so repeatedly subjected to the violence of
the batterer that she knows when it is about to happen even though she
has not done anything to provoke him. Secondly, attorneys use the syn-
drome to explain why deadly force was necessary.32 According to the
theory, the woman will be able to tell if the violence will be particularly
brutal before the attack begins.33 Since attempts to leave the relationship
or stop the abuse have been unsuccessful in the past, the battered
woman's only recourse is to kill her abuser.m Finally, the syndrome has
been used to educate the jury and build the credibility of the battered
woman.3 1 Since many jurors find it hard to believe that the abuse was so
severe if the woman has stayed in the relationship for a long period of
faint hope that the batterer will change, whereas the prospects for change
in the larger community seem less favorable.
GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 25, at 83.
31. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 369-73 (N.J. 1984) (discussing the Battered
Woman's Syndrome as derived from Walker's theory); see also Schopp et al., supra
note 22, at 50.
32. See Schopp et al., supra note 22, at 52-53 (citation omitted).
33. See Schopp et al., supra note 22, at 52 (citations omitted).
34. See Schopp et al., supra note 22, at 53.
35. See Schopp et al., supra note 22, at 52-53.
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time, expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome helps jurors
understand the pattern of battering and why the woman stayed. 6
State v. Kelly" provides a primary example of how the syndrome is
used to support a claim for self-defense in domestic violence homicide
cases. In this case, Ernest abused Gladys throughout their seven year
marriage, and the violence often involved kicking, hitting, and chok-
ing.38 Sometimes the violence occurred as often as once a week; one
time Ernest even attacked and beat her in public." According to Gladys,
on the day of the murder, she and her daughter had gone to see Ernest
at a friend's house to ask for money to buy groceries. When Ernest and
Gladys left the house, Ernest yelled at her, pushed her to the ground,
and started choking her.40 Just when she thought she would pass out
from the choking, two men from the crowd separated them. Gladys
then got up and began to search for her daughter. When she found her
daughter, Gladys saw Ernest running toward her "with his hands
raised. 42 In a moment, unsure of what would happen, Gladys reached
into her pocketbook and stabbed Ernest with a pair of scissors.43 Gladys
was charged with murder, convicted of reckless manslaughter, and sen-
tenced to five years imprisonment.4 Gladys had tried to offer evidence
about the BWS to support her claim of self-defense, but the lower
courts would not admit the expert testimony.45 The Supreme Court of
New Jersey reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the
BWS was "relevant to the honesty and reasonableness of defendant's
belief that deadly force was necessary to protect her against death or se-
rious bodily harm.,
46
36. See Schopp et al., supra note 22, at 52-53; see also Karla Fischer, Neil Vidmar &
Rene Ellis, The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in Domestic Violence
Cases, 46 SMU L. REv. 2117, 2135-36 (1993) excerpted in DoMEsTIC VIOLENCE
LAW: A COMPREHENSIVE OVERVIEW OF CAsEs AND SOURcES 87 (Nancy K.D. Lemon
ed., 1996) (noting that abuse escalates when and if the woman tries to leave). Given
separation abuse, it becomes even more rational to stay in the abusive relationship
than leave, especially if adequate support systems for the woman are unavailable.
37. 478 A.2d 364 (NJ. 1984).
38. See Kelly, 478 A.2d at 369, 377.
39. See Kelly, 478 A.2d at 369.
40. See Kelly, 478 A.2d at 369.
41. See Kelly, 478 A.2d at 369.
42. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 369.
43. See Kelly, 478 A.2d at 369 n.1 (noting that Gladys' version of the homicide was hotly
contested by the state who said that Gladys started the initial fight, that she was yell-
ing her intent to kill Ernest, and that she ran after him to stab him).
44. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 368.
45. See Kelly, 478 A.2d at 369.
46. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 368.
2000]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
The Kelly court defined the BWS as the combination of common
symptoms "resulting from sustained psychological and physical trauma
compounded by aggravating social and economic factors." 47 The court
further stated: "Only by understanding these unique pressures that force
battered women to remain with their mates, despite their long-standing
and reasonable fear of severe bodily harm and the isolation that being a
battered woman creates, can a battered woman's state of mind be accu-
rately and fairly understood."48 The expert in this case, Dr. Veronen,49
wished to testify to the "feelings of anxiety, self-blame, isolation, and,
above all, fear that plagues these women and leaves them prey to a psy-
chological paralysis that hinders their ability to break free or seek
help."50 The expert sought to break the common myths surrounding
battered women-"primarily that such women are masochistic and en-
joy the abuse they receive and that they are free to leave their husbands
but choose not to"-and explain how Gladys perceived the situation at
the time of the killing and that Gladys was suffering from battered
woman's syndrome. 1 Given that the claim of self-defense relies on the
defendant having a reasonable belief that the force used was necessary to
prevent imminent "death or serious bodily harm," the court held that
battered woman's syndrome was relevant.5 2 Moreover, because domestic
violence is complex and subject to many myths and stereotypes, the
court held that "this subject is beyond the ken of the average juror and
thus is suitable for explanation through expert testimony."53
As State v. Kelly demonstrates, the BWS defense is not a separate
defense of its own, rather, it is a way to introduce evidence about the
defendant's mental state and educate the jury on the dynamics of do-
mestic violence. The BWS defense helps show that the defendant lacked
the necessary knowledge and purpose of killing the abuser, and that in-
stead the killing was provoked and/or an act of self-defense. While the
BWS defense has often been successful in mitigating the sentencing or
reducing the conviction from premeditated murder to voluntary man-
slaughter, it is less successful in actually proving self-defense, although
47. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 372.
48. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 372.
49. Dr. Veronen apparently had "considerable experience in counseling, treating, and
studying battered women" and was familiar with the various literature in the field.
Kelly, 478 A.2d at 372-73.
50. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 373.
51. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 373.
52. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 375-78.
53. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 379.
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that is its primary goal." At the very least, it allows jurors to have a more
complete picture of why and in what circumstances the defendant bat-
tered woman killed her abuser. The BWS defense, in that sense, serves
to fulfill the legal system's goal of individual justice based on the unique
facts of each particular case. The BWS defense ensures that the jury has
as full a factual account as possible.
B. The Cultural Defense
The cultural defense is a common law defense that allows defen-
dants, typically immigrants or minorities, to support a claim of
incapacity, provocation, or mistake of fact when faced with a murder
charge." The premise is that the defendant was acting in accordance
with his culture's norms and expectations.56 A defendant presenting
some form of the cultural defense will likely make one of three different
claims. First, he will argue that although he committed the act of killing
someone, that act was justified because the act is not criminal in his own
culture.57 Second, the defendant will argue for a lesser sentence and
lesser charge because the crime he committed would have been treated as
less severe than murder in his own culture.8 The idea behind these two
types of arguments is that the recent immigrant has not yet had time to
assimilate or understand America's social and legal values and thus should
be held to the standards of his old country. Third, the defendant will ar-
gue that the act he committed was the product of provocation and mental
impairment: given his cultural background, he reasonably perceived and
responded to the situation.59 As one commentator summarized, "'A
54. See generally Schneider, supra note 15 (providing an overview of criminal law's treat-
ment of battered women who kill their assailants); see also Angel, supra note 2 (using
one woman's story to illustrate how women fare in the criminal justice system).
55. For a useful overview of the cultural defense's historical background, see Goldstein,
supra note 13, at 144-46.
56. See, e.g., Tomao, supra note 12, at 241; Volpp, (Mis)Identijjing Culture, supra note 8,
at 57-58 (1994).
57. See, e.g., Rivera, supra note 11, at 251 ("The defendant's theory... is that violence
against women, or the particular act at issue, is sanctioned by the culture and may, in
fact, be a recognized cultural norm."); Roy, supra note 8, at 276-77 ("The defense is
usually utilized by recent immigrants, who argue that their lack of understanding of
American norms, coupled with the fact that their actions are justifiable in their own
culture, should justify at least a partial defense, or leniency in sentencing."). See also
infra text accompanying notes 62-71.
58. See, e.g., Rivera, supra note 11, at 251; Roy, supra note 8, at 277. See also infra text
accompanying notes 62-71.
59. See Maguigan, supra note 12, at 48-49.
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cultural defense will negate or mitigate criminal responsibility where
acts are committed under a reasonable, good-faith belief in their propri-
ety, based upon the actor's cultural heritage or tradition."', 0
The cultural defense is largely a product of case law and a desire to
mete out individualized justice. Multiculturalists have vigorously advo-
cated the admission of the cultural defense because it allows for "a wider
variety of voices in American jurisprudence," acknowledges the diversity
of American society, and "counteract[s] the injustice of applying the
dominant culture's legal standards to defendants from other cultures.""
To best understand how the defense works and who uses it, this Section
of the Article will turn to a summary of some of the more celebrated (or
notorious) cases dealing with the cultural defense.
People v. Kong Moua6 2 represents an example of the first type of
cultural defense in a domestic violence and rape case.6 Moua is com-
monly known as the "Hmong marriage by capture case. " 61 In this case,
Kong Moua kidnapped and raped Seng Xiong believing that he was
fulfilling the customary practice of marriage by abduction or capture,
otherwise known as "zij poj niam."65 Both of them had recently immi-
grated to the United States from Laos, 66 and Kong believed Seng wanted
to marry him. Thus when Kong abducted Seng and forced her to have
sex with him to fulfill the rite of zjpoj niam, Kong thought that Seng's
resistance was just a reflection of custom, not an expression of noncon-
sent to sex and marriage. Seng however, did not believe she was
following Hmong custom and instead viewed Kong's advances and sex-
ual intercourse as rape aggravated by kidnapping. 6 Evidence of the
Hmong practice of zi " poj niam initially persuaded the prosecutor to
60. Goldstein, supra note 13, at 143 (quoting John C. Lyman, Cultural Defenses: Viable
Doctrine or Wishful Thinking?, 9 CRim. JusT. J. 87, 88 (1986)).
61. Maguigan, supra note 12, at 36.
62. No. 315972-0 (Fresno County Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 1985) discussed in Maguigan,
supra note 12, at 48.
63. See Maguigan, supra note 12, at 48, 63-69.
64. See, e.g., Deirdre Evans-Pritchard & Alison Dundes Renteln, The Interpretation and
Distortion of Culture: A Hmong 'Marriage by Capture" Case in Fresno, California, 4 S.
CAL. INTERDIScIPLINARY L.J. 1 (1995); Maguigan, supra note 12, at 63-69.
65. See Evans-Pritchard & Renteln, supra note 64; Maguigan, supra note 12, at 63-69;.
66. See Evans-Pritchard & Renreln, supra note 64, at 9.
67. See Evans-Pritchard & Renteln, supra note 64, at 8-13 (discussing both Kong
Moua's and Seng Xiong's version of the story and indicating that Kong believed Seng
voluntarily went with him and "had sexual intercourse"); Maguigan, supra note 12, at
64 ("[Moua] described her resistance to his subsequent rape of her as necessary to
consummate their betrothal and as a culturally appropriate response from a virtuous,
willing woman.").
68. See Evans-Pritchard & Renteln, supra note 64, at 12-13.
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accept a guilty plea for false imprisonment, a misdemeanor.69 The cul-
tural evidence, in this case, was then also used to persuade the judge to
give Kong a low sentence of ninety days imprisonment and a one-
thousand dollar fine.70 In other words, the cultural defense, or, more
accurately, the use of cultural information, helped show the existence of
a mistake of law and/or fact7' and therefore mitigated culpability and
punishment. Kong essentially tried to prove that given his cultural
background and his culture-based perception of Seng's wishes, he acted
in a completely appropriate and legal way.
An example of the second type of cultural defense is People v.
Kimura.72 Kimura concerns a Japanese woman who was so distraught
upon learning of her husband's infidelity that she drowned her children
and attempted suicide. 73 Kimura was charged with first-degree murder,
but pled to manslaughter and received a relatively light sentence of one-
year imprisonment and five years probation with counseling.74 Her de-
fense rested on the premise that her actions resulted from her husband's
infidelity and thus would have been punishable as involuntary man-
slaughter in Japan. 75 The fact that her country of origin did not believe
what she did was a significant criminal offense coupled with the reason-
ableness of her shame and temporary lack of sanity led the prosecutor to
recommend and the judge to give a lenient sentence. 76 As some com-
mentators have suggested, the court essentially accepted the view that
parent-child suicide is "not an uncommon way of escaping certain in-
tolerable situations" and that in Japan, it is "more merciful to kill
children than to leave them ... without parental protection."7 "The
mother who commits suicide without taking her child with her is
blamed as an oni no yo na hito (demon-like person)." 78
69. See Maguigan, supra note 12, at 64.
70. See Maguigan, supra note 12, at 64-65.
71. There is a controversy over what the basis for the plea actually was. See Evans-
Pritchard & Renteln, supra note 64, at 26-28.
72. People v. Kimura, No. A-091133 (Santa Monica Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 1985), cited
and discussed in Maguigan, supra note 12, at 49, 67-69. See also Goldstein, supra
note 13, at 147-49.
73. See Maguigan, supra note 12, at 67.
74. See Maguigan, supra note 12, at 67.
75. See Maguigan, supra note 12, at 68.
76. See Maguigan, supra note 12, at 67-68.
77. See, e.g., Deborah Woo, The People v. Fumiko Kimura: But Which People?, 17 INT'L J.
Soc. L. 404, 411 (1989), cited in Maguigan, supra note 12, at 68 n. 111.
78. Woo, supra note 77, at 411. This case is similar to People v. Helen Wu, 286 Cal.
Rptr. 868 (Cal. Cr. App. 1991). In that case, a Chinese woman attempted parent-
child suicide, but was unable to successfully submit cultural evidence about her
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People v. Dong Lu Chen79 presents a famous example of the third
type of cultural defense: the immigrant defendant lacked the requisite
state of mind because the defendant's culture made it reasonable for
him to perceive and to respond to the situation in a violent way. Dong
Lu offered cultural evidence to show that, as a person from mainland
China, his wife's adultery so completely obliterated his sense of control
that he was provoked to kill his wife. Although Dong Lu had used a
claw hammer to "smash the skull of his wife, Jian Wan Chen,""0 Dong
Lu received only a five-year probationary sentence."' The cultural expert
successfully persuaded the judge to believe that "traditional Chinese
values about adultery and loss of manhood drove Chen to kill his
wife." 82
As each of these cases shows, the cultural defense allows defendants
to offer evidence regarding their cultural background to explain and
justify their actions. "With excuses, cultural evidence is often introduced
or proffered to demonstrate that a defendant's mental status was im-
paired to an extent inconsistent with a finding of criminal
responsibility." 3 While controversial, defendants continue to use the
cultural defense to give the prosecutor (in plea negotiations), the judge
(in sentencing decisions), and the jury (at trial) a complete picture of
the defendant's mental state and background to better achieve the goals
of multiculturalism and individualized justice.
II. THE Two DEFENSES ARE THE SAME
At first glance, the BWS defense and the cultural defenses appear
to be quite different. While the BWS defense first developed as a psy-
chological theory designed to explain the effects of battering upon
battered women, the cultural defenses are primarily a creation of com-
mon law and creative litigation strategies.8  Moreover, the BWS is
subconscious state at the time of the attempted suicide because the jury never re-
ceived the proper instruction. On appeal the trial court's ruling was overturned for
failing to give the defendant's instruction on unconsciousness and instructions re-
garding the defendant's cultural background were held to be admissible. See Helen
Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 887.
79. People v. Dong Lu Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 2, 1988).
80. Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture, supra note 8, at 64.
81. See Maguigan, supra note 12, at 78.
82. See Volpp,(Mis)Identifying Culture, supra note 8, at 64.
83. Maguigan, supra note 12, at 72.
84. After all, there is no single, uniform culture or cultural "theory" that the cultural
defense encapsulates. Rather, a "cultural defense" is simply a term used to refer to the
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predominantly used by women who have suffered extreme abuse at the
hands of their victim, whereas the cultural defense is used mostly by
immigrant men who have neither suffered abuse nor been assaulted by
their victim. 5 To make even clearer this last point, many commentators
argue that while the BWS describes the reality that many battered
women endure, the cultural defense relies on patriarchal and static cul-
tural stereotypes that discriminate against women and harm the goal of
multiculturalism.s6
While the two defenses are distinct, further study and analysis re-
veal that the BWS and the cultural defense are quite similar. Indeed,
many if not all of the problems and criticisms feminists wage against the
cultural defense can be, and are, made against the BWS. This Section of
the Article reveals and analyzes the common problems each defense
faces. Because many feminists argue for the BWS while arguing against
the cultural defense, this Part will begin with an analysis and exploration
of the problems that the cultural defense faces. Critics commonly point
use of a defendant's cultural background as a way to explain why a defendant lacked
the requisite mens rea and how the behavior of a particular defendant establishes the
existence of such "traditional" defenses as diminished capacity and heat of passion. As
Led Volpp states, a "cultural defense" has been presented when "individual defense
attorneys and judges use their discretion to present oi consider cultural factors af-
fecting the mental state or culpability of a defendant." Volpp, (Mis)Identifying
Culture, supra note 8, at 57-58 (referring to the cultural defense as a "legal strat-
egy.").
On a related point, it is important to note that despite this difference between
the two defenses, neither is really a "formal" defense. As Elizabeth Schneider appro-
priately points out, "Judicial opinions in a number of recent battered woman self-
defense cases correctly remind us that there is no separate 'battered woman syndrome'
defense." Schneider, supra note 15, at 510. Similarly, the cultural defense is nowhere
uniformly used with any consistency. See generally Maguigan, supra note 12; Volpp,
(Mis)Identif5ing Culture, supra note 8; Volpp, Talking Culture, supra note 14.
85. I realize that women also use the cultural defense, and other minority groups who
have not just immigrated to the States use its variant. As Maguigan notes, "the use of
cultural information is not a new phenomenon. It is not limited to immigrants. It
does not occur primarily in cases involving violence against women or children." Ma-
guigan, supra note 12, at 56. She points out that the cultural defense has been used
by Native Americans and African Americans. One notable case regarding the at-
tempted use of a "cultural" defense is People v. Rbines, 182 Cal. Rptr. 478 (Ct. App.
1982), which excluded testimony that Black people are culturally different from
other Americans and that Black people tend to talk loudly to one another. The victim
had testified that "the defendant had raped her by using physical force and an in-
timidating tone of voice." Maguigan, supra note 12, at 37. The defense in Rbines
wished to offer the testimony to support the defendant's claim that he made a
"reasonable mistake about the complainant's consent" to sexual intercourse. Magui-
gan, supra note 12, at 37.
86. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 11, at 477-85.
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to six different arguments against the cultural defense: 1) it promotes
stereotypes of cultures and can therefore be racist and ethnocentric; 2) a
cultural defense cannot exist when culture is changing and not static; 3)
judges tend to apply the defense arbitrarily and in an apparently sexist
manner; 4) it often works to the disadvantage of women; 5) there is so
much anti-immigrant and racist sentiment in this society that we cannot
trust a judge and jury receiving cultural evidence to use it properly; and
6) it promotes a view that immigrants and minorities should get a spe-
cial defense in violation of equal treatment and anti-discrimination
ideals. Once those issues are exposed, this Part will explore the criticisms
of the BWS defense and show that each critique of the cultural defense
also applies to the BWS defense.
A. Criticisms of the Cultural Defense
The first argument waged against the cultural defense concerns its
promotion of cultural stereotypes. 7 The Chen case presents a good ex-
ample of how the cultural defense has promoted the stereotype that
Asian men are sexist and must maintain control over "their" women in
order to be true men in their culture. In Chen, the expert witness, a
white anthropologist named Burton Pasternak, claimed that it was
completely reasonable and acceptable in Chinese society for a man to
kill his adulterous wife in a fit of rage or sudden "insanity": "'In the
Chinese context,' adultery by a woman was considered a kind of 'stain'
upon the man, indicating that he had lost 'the most minimal standard
of control' over her."88 Pasternak further claimed that "[t]he Chinese
male would [therefore also] be considered a 'pariah' among Chinese
women because he would be viewed as having been unable to 'maintain
the most minimal standard of control' within his family."89 As Leti
Volpp succinctly commented:
Pasternak's bizarre portrayal of divorce and adultery in China
in fact had little basis in reality.... [Pasternak] admitted he
could not recall a single instance in which a man in China
killed his wife or having ever heard about such an event, yet he
suggested that this was accepted in China. Pasternak's de-
87. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 13; Rivera, supra note 11; Volpp, (Mis)Identifying
Culture, note 8, at 68-72; Volpp, Talking Culture, supra note 12, at 1589.
88. Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture, supra note 8, at 69 (citations omitted).
89. Volpp, (Mis)Identzifing Culture, supra note 8, at 70 (citations omitted).
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scription of 'Chinese society' thus was neither substantiated by
fact nor supported by his own testimony. The description was
in fact his own American fantasy.9
Indeed the Chen case shows not only the stereotyping of Asian so-
ciety but also of American society. Pasternak insisted that he was
exemplary of the "average" American and that therefore, the average
American was white and male-an identity completely distinct from the
Chinese "foreigner." 9 The stereotyping evidences itself even more
clearly in Pasternak's "expert" opinion that Chen was an "inassimilable
alien" because "[o]f all the Asians who come to this country, ... the
people who have the hardest time adjusting to this society are Chinese.
The Japanese do a lot better."92 In essence, the argument that the de-
fense promotes cultural stereotypes consists of two points: 1) that a
culture cannot be defined accurately as a generalization; and 2) that
stereotypes of a minority culture inherently promote inaccurate stereo-
types of the majority culture.
Related to the second argument-that the cultural defense pro-
motes inaccurate stereotypes-is the argument that a "cultural defense"
is infeasible because there is no such thing as a static culture or even a
uniform definition of a certain culture.93 As Maguigan states, "[tihe is-
sue of simply defining 'culture' and its relationship to criminal justice
has long engaged the attention of anthropological scholars, one of
whom suggests that it may be impossible, and it is difficult to imagine
the criminal justice system doing a better job."94 Understanding the im-
possibility of actually defining a single culture in total leads to an
appreciation of the fact that whenever defendants present a cultural de-
fense, they naturally present a static, incomplete picture. The defense
also ignores the possibility of variety and diversity within a culture, as
the Moua case exemplifies. 9 Just as Kong acted within the norms of
Hmong culture by kidnapping and consummating the marriage/raping
Seng, so too did Seng act as a "Hmong woman" who had rejected zijpoj
niam. Although Seng did not accept Kong's actions as culturally appro-
priate, Seng is nevertheless a Hmong woman and a part of the Hmong
culture, however it is defined.
90. Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture, supra note 8, at 70 (citations omitted).
91. See Volpp, (Mis)Identiifing Culture, supra note 8, at 70-71.
92. Volpp, (Mis)Identifjing Culture, supra note 8, at 72.
93. See generally, e.g., Volpp, Talking Culture, supra note 14, at 1589; Tomao, supra note
12.
94. Maguigan, supra note 12, at 52 (citations omitted).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 63-71.
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The third, fourth and fifth arguments against the culture defense
concern the fact that judges arbitrarily apply and accept or reject cul-
tural defenses, and that in the application of the defense, the legal
system justifies violence against women. Both of these points stem from
the reality that the cultural defense is not a formal defense (which means
that it is applied in an ad hoc manner) and that when judges and juries
evaluate such cultural evidence, they can only do so through the lens of
their experience. As Judge Leon Higginbotham remarked regarding the
limitations of a judge's objectivity:
A judiciary that is always unrepresentative of the population's
racial groups and that basically excludes women is bound, at
its best, to lack credibility, and, at its worst, to be partisan....
The bench is more likely to uphold, often even subcon-
sciously, the prejudices of the race it "represents," particularly
when given the discretion to make value judgments."
Similarly, what jurors find credible and relevant as a matter of fact
will depend on whether what the expert tells them comports with their
experiences and specifically addresses myths in a way that is both accu-
rate and persuasive. If an expert states, as Pasternak did in Chen, that
Asian women are supposed to be passive and that the Asian culture is
inherently sexist and misogynistic, the judge and jury will likely believe
him. This information is consistent with the widely held view that East-
ern cultures are less developed, less progressive and more patriarchal
than Western cultures.' 7
Even if the judge and jury do listen with a relatively "open" mind
and weigh the evidence, the same cultural defense which will be suc-
cessful in one case may fail in the next--or worse, the defense may not
even be accepted. For instance while Fumiko Kimura and Helen Wu9'
were able to benefit from the cultural defense regarding the acceptability
of parent-child suicide in their "home" countries, the same defense was
denied to a Korean woman who had accidentally killed her son when
96. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Seeking Pluralism in Judicial Systems: The American Expe-
rience and the South African Challenge, 42 DuKE L.J. 1028, 1054 (1993), cited in
Maguigan, supra note 12, at 54.
97. See, e.g., Volpp, Talking Culture, supra note 14, at 1577-80 (criticizing Coleman,
supra note 14).
98. See generally Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture, supra note 8; Woo, supra note 77; Helen
Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
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she left him alone in a motel room drawer.99 In that case, the woman
was a single mother who had to work and did not have money for a
babysitter. 00 The cultural evidence would have shown that it is common
for Koreans to leave their children alone because in Korea neighbors and
friends are the unpaid "babysitters."01 The evidence also would have
emphasized the woman's difficulty in learning English and becoming
financially secure for her children.10 2 Such evidence would not have ex-
cused her conduct, but it might have exonerated her from culpability
beyond gross negligence or recklessness-a far cry from the purpose and
knowledge needed for a murder conviction.
The second point, that the cultural defense supports and perpetu-
ates the acceptability of violence against women is evident by each of
the cultural defense cases discussed thus far. Chen's "slap on the wrist"
punishment for murdering his wife with a claw hammer sent the resi-
dent Asian community the message that "battered immigrant Asian
women ... had no recourse against domestic violence. As one abuser
reportedly told his wife, 'If this is the kind of sentence you get for kill-
ing your wife, I could do anything to you. I have the money for a good
attorney. ' ' O° Moua sends the same type of message since the cultural
defense in that case enabled a man to be convicted of merely false im-
prisonment rather than the felonious kidnapping and rape with which
he was actually charged.1°4 In Kimura and the similar case of People v.
Helen Wu, the criminal justice system validated the immigrant
"culture's" devaluation of women by accepting the cultural defense and
granting such lenient sentences. As one commentator aptly put it, the
bottom line is that the women and children die.1
0 5
99. See State v. Chong Sun France, 379 S.E.2d 701 (N.C. App. 1989), cited and discussed
in Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture, supra note 8, at 96-97 & nn.164-67.
100. See Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture, supra note 8, at 96-97 & nn.164-67.
101. See Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture, supra note 8, at 96 & n.167.
102. See Volpp, (Mis)Identifjing Culture, supra note 8, at 96 n.167.
103. Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture, supra note 8, at 77. This comment also raises an-
other point that poverty and legal aid attorneys will be sure to note: with the
acceptance of such cultural defenses, the cost of a successful defense limits the avail-
ability of such "individualized justice" to the privileged rich immigrant. For women
who kill their abusers, such status and money is likely to be unavailable.
104. This conclusion assumes that Seng Xiong's version of the story is correct. There is a
dispute about what actually happened, and the settlement or plea bargain which en-
tailed pleading guilty to false imprisonment, spending 90 days in jail and paying
$1,000 to Seng's family, ensures that the true details remain obscure. See Evans-
Pritchard & Renteln, supra note 64, at 8-13, 26-29.
105. See Smith, supra note 11, at 478. But see, e.g., Volpp, Talking Culture, supra note 12,
at 1576-80 (advocating an intersectional analysis and arguing that the goals of mul-
ticulturalism and feminism are not antithetical). Goldstein argues that use of the
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The sixth argument, finally, concerns the belief that immigrants
and other minorities, by virtue of their race, ethnicity and immigrant
status, are benefiting from a separate defense that others cannot use
which violates the equality principle in our law."06 The opponents of the
cultural defense claim it carves out a special exception to the fact that
"mistake of law is not a defense" to further the goal of multiculturalism
and respect for different races.107 Treating people equally means treating
people as individuals without regard to group stereotypes. The cultural
defense appears therefore to be a separate defense in violation of the
equality principle because it renders convictions on the basis of group
characteristics and stereotypes. As Sharon Tomao asserts, the cultural
defense "undercut[s] efforts to secure individualized justice within the
criminal justice system by shifting the focus from the defendant to her
culture."' s
B. Criticisms of the Battered Woman Syndrome Defense
Although the BWS has enjoyed greater success than in the past and
has promoted an awareness of the complexity of domestic violence, it
too has fallen prey to many criticisms. Opponents of BWS as a defense
for women who kill their assailants also make six different arguments: 1)
it promotes stereotypes of women as passive and helpless; 2) it inaccu-
rately portrays women as mentally ill and hysterical; 3) there is no single
"battered woman" and different women or victims of abuse respond in
different ways; 4) the defense works to the disadvantage of minorities;
5) it provides special treatment to women who kill in violation of equal
treatment and anti-discrimination ideals; and 6) there is so much sexism
in today's society that we cannot trust a judge and jury to use BWS de-
cultural defense works against women in an even more severe way-under the guise
of helping each member of the culture. Women and children comprise a sizeable
proportion of these other cultural communities; yet when the cultural defense is used,
it is often used to condone violence against them-the very people the defense is
meant to respect and protect. See Goldstein, supra note 13, at 163-64. "Only a small
percentage of immigrant populations are protected under a blanket cultural defense.
The women are not protected from violence, and the children are not protected from
abuse or, even, death as in Kimura." Goldstein, supra note 13, at 163 (citations
omitted).
106. See Goldstein, supra note 13, at 144. See generally Tomao, supra note 12.
107. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 13, at 144, 158; Tomao, supra note 12, at 256.
108. Tomao, supra note 12, at 255.
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fense appropriately."' This list of arguments against the BWS defense is
strikingly similar to the list of arguments waged against the cultural de-
fense. Indeed all that differs between the two lists is the application of
the arguments-in one case we are talking about race and culture while
in the other we are talking about women and sexism.
The argument that the BWS defense promotes a stereotype of
women as weak and helpless is easy to see given the syndrome's meaning
and definition. The whole defense is predicated on the notion that bat-
tered women are helpless and weak; the abused woman is a passive
victim. In this country, viewing women as weak and inferior is part of
our sexist society. It is the idea that women are weak and emotional that
has kept women out of the workforce, out of the armed forces and in
the home; it is the notion that women are frail that has kept women
constantly dependent on men.II° To support the BWS, its opponents
argue, is to support the stereotypes that have subjugated women for a
long time. " ' Professor Anne Coughlin, for instance, has even argued
that the syndrome not only reinforces negative gender roles, but also
"reaffirms [the] invidious understanding of women's incapacity for ra-
tional self-control." 12 She claims that "by denying that women are
capable of abiding by criminal prohibitions, in circumstances said to
afflict many women at some point during their lives, the defense denies
that women have the same capacity for self-governance that is attributed
to men.". In other words, the opponents attack the BWS defense be-
cause, while it may keep women out of jail or at least keep them from
having as long a sentence as they otherwise might have, the BWS de-
fense reinforces the same negative stereotypes that have kept women, as
a class, subordinate to men. The practical implications of reaffirming
this stereotype is the further subjugation of women.1
109. See, e.g., Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1994); GONDOLF
& FISHER, supra note 25, at 78; Angel, supra note 2, at 309-12; Moore, supra note
10; Phyllis Goldfarb, Describing Without Circumscribing: Questioning the Construction
of Gender in the Discourse oflntimate Violence, 64 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 582 (1996).
110. This is not to say that the perception of women is the only reason for their "second
class" status in society. Indeed there are many factors that have led to women's infe-
ridr social status, the most important of which is male power. See, e.g., CATHERINE A.
MACKINNON, TheArt of the Impossible, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 1, 1-17 (1987).
111. See, e.g., Coughlin, supra note 109, at 6; Goldfarb, supra note 109, at 608-11;
Moore, supra note 10.
112. Coughlin, supra note 109, at 6.
113. Coughlin, supra note 109, at 6.
114. This particular argument-that admittance of the BWS defense means that women
do not have the capacity for rational self-control and responsibility-seems at least
facially problematic. The BWS defense could also be interpreted as a recognition of
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A related argument is that the BWS defense portrays women inac-
curately. As previously discussed, the BWS defense indicates that
battered women are mentally ill and require "specialized counseling to
address their debilitated psychological state." '' However, what many
feminists have pointed out is that battered women are not suffering
from learned helplessness but are constantly making efforts to survive.
Many battered women do not just sit idly by, passively accepting the
abuse; rather they try to alleviate the abuse by making their partner
happy, and when that fails, by seeking help or trying to leave. The rea-
son battered women stay in an abusive relationship, according to this
alternate theory, is that they lack access to resources that help them
leave for good. Battered women are actors who try to leave and reach
out for help but often meet little or no success. This lack of options and
an intimate awareness of when their assailant will strike next leads the
battered woman to kill."6 Seen in this light, many feminists argue that
the BWS defense mischaracterizes the reality of the abuse and the effect
it has on some women because women who kill in these situations truly
are acting in self-defense." 7 Unlike the message of the BWS defense,
that women are mentally ill and hysterical, the survivor theory shows
that women are responding reasonably to violence that threatens their
own lives. ' 8
the severe injustice and violence that women suffer at the hands of men. It acknowl-
edges that women should not be responsible for reacting in the only logical self-
defense way possible when confronted with life-threatening violence. Why blame the
woman, when the man is the one who has attacked the woman in the past with im-
punity?
115. GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 25, at 78.
116. See GONDOLF & FIsHER, supra note 25, at 78, 79 & tbl. 2-1 (providing a helpful
summary of how the "survivor hypothesis" works).
117. See Angel, supra note 2, at 309-12; see also, Moore, supra note 10, at 302 ("The
effect of asserting the battered woman syndrome in the courtroom has been to treat
battered women in a way that is demeaning and inferior to men by treating them as
people with diminished intellectual capacity, rather than treating them as reasonable
people who act in self-defense to save their lives, particularly when they kill absent a
confrontation.").
118. While it is true that abused women often kill their assailants when the assailants are
not using life-threatening force, the reality of domestic violence is that the abused
woman will die of the abuse if she does not get out of the situation and adequate in-
tervention is not available. See Moore, supra note 10, at 300 ("[A] 1991 United States
Department of Health and Human Services study on family violence reports that
more than one-third of all women slain in this country die at the hands of a husband
or partner. The study also estimates that four million women are beaten each year by
their husbands or mates, and as a result of the battering, more than four women die
each day." (citations omitted)).
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This argument naturally flows into the criticism that the BWS de-
fense improperly and inaccurately essentializes" 9 who "women" are and
what a "battered woman" is. In order for the syndrome defense to work,
the woman must be portrayed as passive and weak-a subject of vio-
lence. Needless to say, this is not true for all women; many are strong,
assertive, and active. Many women, simply said, do not fit the stereo-
type. What attorneys will do is try to fit their client into the BWS
defense-make them appear weak and passive. However, while many
white and Asian women may be able to fit themselves believably into
that stereotype because society invests in such a stereotype for these
groups of women, black women are abandoned. As Professor Shelby
A.D. Moore persuasively reveals,
African American women are viewed as angry, masculine,
domineering, strong, and sexually permissive-characteristics
which do not denote 'victim.' As a result, judges and jurors are
less likely to believe African American women are 'victims'
when they assert self-defense while relying on the battered
woman syndrome as the justification for killing their abus-
120
ers.
Thus, although the BWS defense purports to help battered women
as a whole, it actually promotes not only a sexist view of women but also
a racist view of who battered women are.121 What the BWS defense fails
to do is account for the reality that women cannot be essentialized into
this unitary being divorced from race, class, and sexual orientation.22 In
this way, opponents of the BWS argue, the defense both falsely defines
women and the battered woman and disadvantages minorities. Indeed,
the syndrome does not even help the entire group which it was designed
to help-all women, not just women who fit the racial stereotype.
Because of the success and general acceptance of the BWS, some
commentators feel that a special defense has evolved just for women
119. I use the term "essentializes" to refer to the process of defining the core essence or
"being" of all women, as if all women share a particular trait. See, e.g., Moore, supra
note 10, at 336-46.
120. See Moore, supra note 10, at 302-03.
121. Moore further points out that "[t]he unfortunate result is that African American
women stand before the court without the same defense readily available to white
women and, perhaps, without a constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial."
Moore, supra note 10, at 336.
122. See Moore, supra note 10, at 337.
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who kill."l On the basis of gender, they claim, the law is allowing
women to receive possibly lighter sentences, if any, for the crime of
killing their assailant 24 The defense does not account for men or part-
ners of same-sex couples who are abused. 125 As one commentator
argued, "[The issue of domestic violence is] being pushed beyond reason
... [by] allowing the self-defense argument to be muddied by re-
venge."126 Others, like Professor Coughlin, argue that the defense
demeans women by giving them an option that only women can exer-
cise; if women wish to be equal, the BWS defense must be eradicated. 27
Finally, opponents argue that the BWS defense cannot be appro-
priately used because of the sexist society in which we live.'28 The BWS
defense in a sense is discriminatory not only because it perpetuates gen-
der stereotypes in a racist manner but also because a judge and jury will
interpret the evidence of battering in a sexist manner. The believability
of the syndrome as a defense rests on how likely the evidence comports
with the judge and jury's understanding of what is reasonable for a per-
son to do. It is this fact that prevents African American women from
being able to successfully use the BWS defense. As Professor Moore re-
veals, "If judges and jurors view [African American women] as strong
and domineering, they are unlikely to believe that African American
women suffer psychologically as a result of being battered."' 29 In addi-
tion to the problems with the BWS defense arising from the reality of
our sexist society, problems exist with the genesis of the defense. As
Professor Coughlin has argued, "the defense is the offspring of the pa-
triarchal assumptions from which the discipline of psychology, as well as
law, [is] constructed."3 ° Given the sexist society reflected in the judge
and jury and the syndrome's inherently sexist origins, the opponents
ask, how can it be the right tool for battered women?
123. See, e.g., infra notes 125-27.
124. See, e.g., infra notes 125-27.
125. See, e.g., Goldfarb, supra note 109.
126. Margaret B. Carlson, The Feminist Mistake, REDBOoK, Nov. 1991, at 24.
127. See Coughlin, supra note 109, at 8 ("by providing this kind of accommodation for
women only, the criminal law would continue to affirm that men posses the capacity
for rational self-governance, but women do not").
128. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 10, at 347; Coughlin, supra note 109.
129. Moore, supra note 10, at 333.
130. Coughlin, supra note 109, at 7.
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C. The Cultural and Battered Woman
Syndrome Defenses Compared
Each of the arguments against the BWS defense mirrors the argu-
ments against the cultural defense. Both defenses perpetuate and use
stereotypes in a harmfil way. Both essentialize 31 their subject, whether
it is culture or who a "battered woman" is. Both disadvantage minorities
and women; each harms the group it is supposed to protect. Both pro-
vide special defenses for a group of people that non-group members
cannot use. Both defenses serve to reinforce sexism and racism that exist
within society. Indeed the two defenses appear to be more similar than
different. To some extent, the only real difference between them is that
the cultural defense deals with culture and the BWS defense deals with
battered women.
Still, feminists argue that the cultural defense is different from the
BWS defense and that the cultural defense should be not be among the
tools of defense attorneys. 32 For instance, Taryn Goldstein argues that
because the BWS defense is an accepted psychological syndrome that
has evolved from extensive research and the cultural defense is based
more on subjective social science and social mores, the cultural defense
should be excluded from trial, but the BWS defense maintained. 133 She
argues that while the BWS defense is an objective, identifiable and ac-
cepted defense, the cultural defense is subjective and lacks a constant
definition.3 3 As explored above, however, such a commentary disregards
half of the analysis. It is true that the cultural defense falsely presumes
the existence of a static culture and is often based on varying subjective
social mores, but the same can be said about the BWS defense. Indeed,
Professor Moore attacks the notion that the BWS defense is objective
and accurate. Her critique exposes the flawed methodology of Walker's
research, 35 the way in which the BWS defense relies on a victim status
paradigm that subjugates women,3 6 and the fact that the BWS defense
misstates the reality that "one is neither a victim nor a victimizer at all
times during one's existence. "37 Thus the same criticism made about
the cultural defense more than apdy applies to the BWS defense.
131. See supra note 119.
132. See, e.g., Angel, supra note 2, at 296-99; Goldstein, supra note 13, at 164-67.
133. See Goldstein, supra note 13, at 164-67.
134. See Goldstein, supra note 13, at 164-67.
135. See Moore, supra note 10, at 317-21.
136. See Moore, supra note 10, at 318.
137. Moore, supra note 10, at 325.
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If the first argument distinguishing the two defenses fails to be per-
suasive, Goldstein argues that permitting the cultural defense would
lead to a slippery slope: because "the cultural defense could literally be
applied to everyone, there is nothing to stop every defendant from at-
tempting to utilize the defense."'38 According to Goldstein, the BWS
defense does not fall prey to this argument because the defense only ap-
plies to battered women-an identifiable group."39 The first response is
simply that there is no such thing as an "identifiable" single, unitary
type of battered woman. The second reply is that although the cultural
defense could theoretically apply to anyone-American, Asian, African,
European-the practical reality is that it cannot be so used. The defense
only works for immigrant and some minority groups. The idea is that
the criminal justice system only finds culpable those who have the nec-
essary mens rea and those who can reasonably be expected to "know"
the values and mores of our society."o Thus while everyone has a
"cultural history," only immigrants and a few specially situated non-
immigrants will be able to take advantage of the cultural defense.'
4'
An insistence that the cultural defense is more problematic than the
BWS defense is also insufficient to materially distinguish between the
two defenses. One could argue that the cultural defense is improper be-
cause it poses more material and symbolic harms to society in general
than does the BWS defense. The material harms are that the cultural
defense causes the female victims to disappear and permits violence
against women and children under the guise of multiculturalism. The
symbolic harm is that racist and ethnocentric stereotypes are taken to be
true reflections of reality such that minorities and immigrants will con-
tinue to be viewed as inferior members of our society. While these
harms do result from the current use of the cultural defense, the same
harms arise from the current use of the BWS defense. As discussed
above, the BWS defense also perpetuates a harmful view of women as
weak and passive, allows a black woman to suffer behind bars for killing
138. Goldstein, supra note 13, at 167.
139. See Goldstein, supra note 13, at 166-67.
140. After all, the reason why mistake of law is not a defense is that the law merely codifies
society's moral values. If a person commits an act that he should have known that so-
ciety abjured, then whether he knew a law also existed to prohibit the conduct is
irrelevant. Our criminal justice system does not expect that everyone will go to their
lawyer to see whether their proposed action is legal; rather the criminal justice system
wants to ensure that people act in a socially moral way. See generally KADISH &
SCHULHOFER, supra note 20, at 257-82. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying
text.
141. For a discussion of who can use the cultural defense, see supra Part I.B.
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her assailant when a white woman making the same claim would likely
have a lesser sentence or go free. The BWS defense allows the focus at
trial to shift from the woman who actually was abused and survived, to
a stereotypical woman who was helpless and mentally ill. The BWS de-
fense, quite simply, is not much better than the cultural defense in this
respect. To the extent that the BWS defense can legitimately be viewed
as less harmful, the bottom line is still that both defenses have bad con-
sequences and fail to help the defendants in a nonracist and nonsexist
manner.
A last attempt to distinguish the two defenses might focus on the
fact that while the cultural defense is predominantly used by men who
kill, abuse and/or rape relatively innocent women, the BWS defense is
predominantly used by women who kill their abusers-men who have
wrecked havoc and terror in the women's lives.' This argument focuses
on who the "victims" are and whether they "deserved" to die. On its
face, this argument is sympathetic. However, this argument misses the
mark in two distinct ways. First, it is important to realize that men
aren't the only ones who can and do use the cultural defense; Asian
women, for instance, have justly and successfully used the defense to
receive a lighter sentence. 44 Battered women who use the BWS defense,
moreover, can successfully use the defense only where the battering was
so severe as to make it reasonable for the woman to use deadly force.
Second, and more significantly, the argument fails to recognize that
the criminal justice system only punishes those who both commit the
wrong act and have the corresponding bad mind, such as malice afore-
thought, purpose or knowledge. Thus, the fact that we don't believe the
victim should have died or been raped by the defendant just makes us
think that the defendant had the requisite bad mind, but it is not conclu-
sive proof. The cultural defense then would come in to possibly defeat
that presumption and show that in fact the person lacked the evil men-
tal state and is therefore guilty of a lesser crime-he was incapacitated,
temporarily insane due to cultural provocation, or reasonably believed
he was doing nothing wrong because of the particular cultural lens he
wears, and he was reasonably unable to be familiar with the mores of
American society. The BWS defense functions in the same way.
142. In other words, the woman usually has done nothing more than have an affair with
another man. See Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 2, 1988), cited and dis-
cussed in Volpp, (Mis)Identzifing Culture, supra note 8, at 64-77.
143. Cf. Smith, supra note 11, at 465-70 (arguing that the batterer's violence narrows the
choices available to battered women).
144. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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Without the BWS defense, the judge and jury would not know that the
"victim" abused and battered the defendant; the judge and jury would
only see that the deceased was sleeping at the time that the defendant
murdered him. Both the cultural and the BWS defenses seek to rebut
the presumption of bad mind by offering a clearer picture of the defen-
dant's life, act, and mental state.
The arguments against the two defenses are real, and the worries
are substantial. The bottom line is that no matter how hard feminists
try to distinguish between the two defenses to argue that the cultural
defense is indefensible as a matter of law, the cultural defense and the
BWS defense are materially similar. One cannot accept one defense
without accepting the other defense in a theoretically consistent man-
ner. After all, the same arguments for why the cultural defense is flawed
apply with equal force to the BWS defense. Feminists cannot simply
discredit the cultural defense by claiming that it perpetuates violence
against women, because the same argument can forcefully be made
against the BWS defense. Stereotypes, essentialism, and inaccuracies in
theory and application to reality abound in both defenses. Moreover,
the two defenses are used for the same purposes-to show a lack of the
appropriate mens rea and thereby serving to excuse or mitigate the de-
fendant's conduct. The very real similarities and lack of material
differences indicate that feminists must treat the cultural and BWS de-
fenses the same way. No basis exists for privileging one over the other.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMPARISON
Given the similarity of the defenses and the numerous problems as-
sociated with them, the legitimate question is whether both defenses
should therefore be eliminated. The criticisms against the cultural and
the BWS defenses are persuasive. However the criticisms do not neces-
sarily lead to the conclusion that both defenses should be abandoned
completely. Rather, this Section of the Article takes the position that
both defenses should be admissible in an informal way: evidence of bat-
tering and evidence of culture should be admitted to show that the
defendant did not have the requisite mens rea to be criminally culpable.
Because the fear of stereotyping and racist/sexist usage of both defenses
is warranted, this Section briefly discusses one possible way to deal with
the evidence without promoting racist, ethnocentric, and sexist stereo-
types. This Article does not arrive at a conclusion of how best to
mitigate the harms caused, however. Instead, this Article promotes the
search for creative ways to effectively curb the harmful effects of admit-
[Vol. 7":107
UNDERSTANDING THE BATTERED WOMAN
ting such information in our racist and sexist society without denying
each defendant the right to individualized justice and a fair trial.
The criminal justice system's emphasis on mental state and the
constitutional demand of a fair trial for all defendants dictate that cul-
tural evidence and evidence of domestic violence must be admissible.
To determine whether a defendant had the requisite purpose and
knowledge when committing the criminal act, the judicial system must
probe the psyche; the judge and jury must know what the person was
likely to think or perceive given his or her specific circumstances. Evi-
dence of the defendant's culture or history of abuse by the victim is
therefore relevant to know the fill story, whether there was malice
aforethought, incapacity, or a reasonable belief of imminent bodily in-
jury that would qualify the defendant for self-defense. In the case of
People v. Kimura,"' the cultural evidence indicating that Japanese cul-
ture views parent-child suicide as involuntary manslaughter and that the
culture would find Ms. Kimura's wish to commit the suicide due to her
husband's adultery reasonable was relevant and necessary to establishing
Ms. Kimura's mental state. Similarly, evidence that the defendant suf-
fered repeated abuse by the "victim" is relevant to state of mind because
it may show that the woman was acting in self-defense or in a state of
trauma induced by the victim. Indeed, the primary reason feminists de-
veloped and started using the BWS defense was to educate the jury and
ensure that they heard the full story-the "woman's story."'46 If, in fact,
the criminal justice system values individualized justice,14 such that
people are punished only for the crimes they actually committed, then
the full story must include both the battered woman's story and the
immigrant's cultural story. As Professor Lawrence said:
145. No. A-091133 (Santa Monica Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 1985).
146. As many feminists have forcefully argued, the criminal justice system is male-
centered. See generally MACKINNON, supra note 110; Angel, supra note 2. Male per-
ception and experience define what is reasonable and what equals self-defense. The
law is not neutral, although it aims to give neutral individualized justice by looking at
one's mental state and punishing only those who have the evil mind and did the evil
deed. See, e.g., Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95
YALE LJ. 1373 (1986) (critiquing the notion of neutrality and arguing against the
falseness of abstraction). If individualized justice is the goal, as it should be, then the
justice system must take into account alternate, yet legitimate, experiences of women
and immigrants-viewpoints that often are not heard. The "facts" sought at trial
naturally must include the fact of the woman's and immigrant's experience as it re-
lates to the crime committed.
147. See, e.g., Tomao, supra note 12, at 242-43, 251-56; Note, The Cultural Defense in
the Ciminal Law, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1293, 1296-99 (1986).
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The historical and cultural setting is critical to the reader's [or
juror's] interpretation of the facts, feelings, and understand-
ings.... Human problems considered and resolved in the
absence of context are often misperceived, misinterpreted, and
mishandled. But the hazards and liabilities of noncontextual
interpretation and decision making are not experienced ran-
domly. Blacks and others whose stories have been and are
excluded from the dominant discourse are more likely to be
injured by the error of noncontextual methodology."
To eliminate any cultural evidence or any evidence of battering
would result in a grave injustice: neither of the two "types" of defen-
dants would actually have a jury of his or her peers who appreciate
trifles.' Neither of the defendants would receive the punishment they
deserve.
The problem, however, is that admitting such evidence still evokes
the same problems of stereotyping and essentialism that the critics of the
BWS and cultural defenses revealed. So the question becomes: given
that cultural evidence and evidence of battering is relevant on a very
basic theoretical level, how can the criminal justice system admit such
evidence without promoting the racist, ethnocentric, and sexist conse-
quences that the cultural and the BWS defenses currently raise?
On a theoretical level, admitting "evidence of' culture and batter-
ing, as opposed to having a specific defense, enables the attorneys to
show who the defendant actually is. In the context of a black battered
woman who has slain her batterer, the defense could present evidence of
battering and the defendant's personal experience of being black and
battered in our racist and sexist society without trying to show that she
was passive, quiet or otherwise stereotypically white.'50 As Professor
Phyllis Goldfarb eloquently commented regarding the need for evidence
of battering in the same-sex couple context, "[t]he existence of intimate
violence in gay and lesbian relationships does challenge the dominant
theoretical accounts of intimate violence that feminists have offered. It
is important to appreciate, however, that it need not challenge their vi-
148. Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as Strggle,
65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2231, 2281 (1992).
149. This expression comes from Marina Angel's article, Criminal Law and Women: Giv-
ing the Abused Woman Who Kills A Jury ofHer Peers Who Appreciate Trifles. See Angel,
supra note 2, at 229-32.
150. See Moore, supra note 10, at 297-304, 346-47 (challenging the legal system to
break away from the rigid definitions of woman in the BWS defense).
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ability-in-context, just their generalizability."'' In other words, instead
of trying to make the evidence fit into a certain stereotype of what cul-
ture is and who a battered woman is supposed to be, the defendants can
provide evidence of their particular backgrounds.
On a practical level, Professor Holly Maguigan proposes that cul-
tural evidence should be admitted to show the particular defendant's
mens rea and then be subject to counterevidence, "cross-examination,
rebuttal evidence, and reasoned argument."'52 In other words, both
prosecution and defense would have to take on the burden of zealously
advocating for their client by fighting inaccurate and irrelevant stereo-
types. If the defense attempts to offer evidence of general cultural
attitudes divorced from the reality of what the defendant actually expe-
rienced or believed, then the prosecution will have an opportunity to
present the counter-argument. The idea is that both sides must accept
cultural evidence only after critical reflection.1
3
Similarly in the context of a battered woman who kills her batterer,
Professors Elizabeth Schneider and Shelby Moore both emphasize the
need for lawyers to educate the jury and fight stereotypes to ensure that
the defendants are getting a fair trial. Schneider argues rather generally
that "every case [must be] heard on its own merits, with full
deliberation and careful review of the facts, presented in a meaningful
151. Goldfarb, supra note 109, at 630-31 (emphasis added).
152. Maguigan, supra note 12, at 93.
In cases in which appropriate evidentiary rulings require the admission of
cultural evidence, the burden falls on prosecutors to expose any flaws in the
use of the material. Prosecutors must be held to a standard of performance
in which they rebut cultural stereotypes with accurate information and rea-
soned argument. It is they, and not judges, who have the task of
challenging the validity of defense evidence.
Maguigan, supra note 12, at 90-91. Professor Maguigan uses the Mike Tyson rape
trial as an example of a prosecutor who effectively combatted racist and sexist stereo-
types to get a conviction. Maguigan, supra note 12, at 92-98.
153. Cf. Volpp, Talking Culture, supra note 12, at 1611-13 ("Information about a defen-
dant's culture should never be reduced to stereotypes about a community, but should
concretely address the individual's location in her community, diaspora, and his-
tory."). Volpp and Maguigan essentially ask that:
prosecutors and community groups challenge evidence as irrelevant when
it is based on stereotypes with little basis in reality, provide testimony to
demonstrate how particular cultural notions are contested within commu-
nities, and present evidence that is based on accurate descriptions of the
pressures that individuals face, both within their communities and with-
out.
Volpp, Talking Culture, supra note 12, at 1612-13 (citing Maguigan, supra note 12,
at 90-97).
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process of individualization."'54 She argues that not only must the jury
hear all the facts through the appropriate challenging of inaccurate and
irrelevant stereotypical evidence, but that lawyers, judges, and legal
scholars themselves must engage in a self-reflective challenge of the
biases and misinformation they harbor.' 5 Only if the lawyers are
themselves "sensitive .to the problem of gender construction in [their]
interpretation of [battered women's] experiences, consideration of their
legal implications, and translation of these experiences into law" will the
lawyers be able to present evidence to the jury in a nonstereotypical
way!" Moore further comments that for African American women's
stories to be heard, "jurors and judges must recognize differences on
several levels." 57 Gender and racial stereotypes and considerations must
both be taken into account. For this to happen, all participants in the
criminal justice system, from jurors to judges and lawyers, must learn
about the varied realities of different women and cultures and self-
reflect on the biases they themselves hold.
Unfortunately, the task of education is extremely difficult to ac-
complish. As Moore states, "[t]he burden of recognizing and
discounting the negative images of African American women often does
not permit judges and jurors to do so."'58 However, to eliminate the
opportunity for defendants to offer cultural evidence and evidence of
battering would only lead to the omission of contextual information,
thus enabling the perpetual miscarriage of justice. The education pro-
posal is tough but necessary. It cannot be the only way however, and it
is incumbent upon all of us to keep searching for a solution to the
problems that relevant information of culture and battering present.
CONCLUSION
The admissibility of the cultural and BWS defenses has stirred an
extraordinary amount of scholarly debate. Each defense has benefited
some defendants by allowing them to tell their story and show how
their culture or the domestic violence they endured led them to commit
the crime charged. The defenses have allowed both men and women to
receive lighter sentences than would have been possible without the evi-
dence. The problem lies in the cost to society, to the victims, and to the
154. Schneider, supra note 15, at 523.
155. See Schneider, supra note 15, at 523-24.
156. Schneider, supra note 15, at 524.
157. Moore, supra note 10, at 343.
158. Moore, supra note 10, at 344.
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defendants themselves when these two defenses are used without critical
reflection.
Many scholars, especially feminist scholars, have tried to distin-
guish between the cultural and the BWS defenses in support of
eliminating the cultural defense. They argue, inter alia, that the cultural
defense promotes racist and sexist stereotypes, uses an essentialist defi-
nition of culture, and perpetuates violence against women. What they
often fail to realize is that the BWS defense is riddled with similar
problems. This Article has shown that the BWS defense also promotes
racist and sexist stereotypes because the defense presumes a weak, pas-
sive, stereotypically white heterosexual woman. The BWS defense in
this way discriminates against African American women who are
stereotypically viewed as loud, lascivious, angry and at times violent.
The BWS defense also uses an essentialist definition of woman, which
harms all women. Indeed, this Article reveals that the cultural and the
BWS defenses have not only the same purpose, but also the same
harmful consequences. Distinguishing between the two defenses there-
fore, is theoretically inconsistent.
Just because the defenses are materially indistinguishable, however,
does not mean that cultural evidence and evidence of battering must be
excluded at trial, at negotiations, or at sentencing. Rather, individual-
ized justice, a focus on mens rea in criminal law, and the right to a fair
trial all dictate that this evidence must be admitted. Thus, feminist
scholars and all participants in the criminal justice system have a new
challenge, a new question to answer: how to admit cultural evidence
and evidence of battering without promoting the stereotypes and with-
out allowing our racist and sexist society to abuse the information?
Some suggest that educating all parties is necessary. They are probably
right, but education alone is insufficient. This Article therefore, chal-
lenges all lawyers, judges, jurors, and legal scholars to search for a better
solution-a solution that permits the evidence to come in as relevant,
but eliminates the attendant risks. t
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